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MUSICAL AFFECTS AND THE LIFE OF FAITH: 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE 
RELIGIOUS POTENCY OF MUSIC 
Mark Wynn 
The paper argues that the religious suggestiveness of music can be illumi-
nated by reference to a number of themes drawn from contemporary phi-
losophy of music, in particular the idea that the affective states expressed in 
music lack material objects, are often grasped "sympathetically," may 
escape verbalisation, and lack action-guiding content. Together these 
themes suggest that music may express, and enable its hearers to take on, 
an affectively laden "world-view." The paper explores the thought that 
such "attitudes" may be religiously important not only in setting the affec-
tive tone of our relationship to the world, but also in relationship to God. 
It has long been supposed that among the arts, music has a preeminent 
claim to religious or metaphysical significance. In this paper, I shall argue 
that this ancient theme can be substantiated in the terms provided by 
recent discussion in the philosophy of music. Specifically, I shall examine 
the idea that music is religiously potent because of its implications for the 
quality of our felt responses to the world. I begin with some brief general 
remarks on the emotions, before considering the relationship between 
music and the emotions. I shall then apply these reflections to the question 
of how music may be religiously important. 
I. The emotions 
For the purposes of this discussion, I shall follow Robert Roberts and think 
of the emotions as serious concern-based construals.1 On this account, my 
being afraid of a dog, for example, is a matter of my construing the dog as 
dangerous, and doing this "concemfully," that is, in such a way as to take 
the dog to pose a threat to something I value. More exactly, it is enough 
that the dog should appear to me to pose a threat, even if I would not 
assert as much: in that case, the construal will count as "serious." While 
analytically distinguishable, these various elements of construal, concern 
and seriousness constitute an integrated state of mind in their life setting. 
For instance, my construal of an interviewer as threatening may involve 
my taking her to be powerful and contemptuous, where these qualities are 
"filtered through" my concern to make a favourable impression.' 
On Roberts' account, our construal of situations lies to some degree 
within our control, and accordingly, in certain cases, we can choose which 
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emotion to feel. For instance, if I am taking a significant risk in order to res-
cue someone, then I may well feel fear; but this emotion can be overcome, 
at least in principle, by refocusing my attention, so that I construe the situa-
tion not as one of risk, but as an opportunity to bring someone to safety. In 
this case, there need be no shift in my judgement about whether or not the 
situation is indeed dangerous (such a shift may well lie outside my con-
trol); instead, the change has to do with which aspects of the situation are 
salient in my construal of it? 
Drawing on this same analytical framework, Roberts also seeks to 
understand the relationship of actions and physiological states to the emo-
tions. For example, in envy my concern for self-esteem may be channelled 
through my construal of someone as a rival for recognition, with the result 
that I behave in ways that are calculated to undermine his reputation.4 
(Hence emotions may themselves generate concerns, in this instance the 
concern to undermine a person's reputation.) Roberts also allows, natural-
ly, that sensations are typical of many emotions. And he adds that we may 
come to adopt a certain concernful construal of a situation on feeling a sen-
sation of the kind that is often conjoined with that sort of construal. For 
instance, the sensation of blushing may contribute to my sense that I have 
done something embarrassing.s 
ntis account of the emotions as unified states of mind, which can be 
understood in terms of the notions of construat concern and seriousness, 
while briet will suffice I think for our purposes. 
II. Music and the emotions 
There is a long-standing tradition of associating music with the emotions.6 
Despite the antiquity of this theme, there continues to be disagreement 
over how this relationship is to be understood. Drawing on two recent 
works on the subject, I shall set out one general approach to these issues. 
Although written independently of one another, these two works agree in 
broad outline, and while there are, of course, other schools of thought, the 
account expounded here commands enough respect within the philosophy 
of music to provide, I suggest, a worthwhile starting point for our enquiry. 
On some views, "pure" or "absolute" music (including symphonies, 
string quartets and other instrumental works) is incapable of expressing 
definite emotions, because it cannot express thoughts, and the differentiae 
of the emotions are given by the different thoughts (or construals) of which 
they are constituted. On this understanding, while music may be the occa-
sion for the formation of various emotions, the connection is one of adven-
titious association, and accordingly variable from person to person and 
time t9 time, and of no value for understanding the intrinsic character of 
music. The authors I wish to examine both contest this claim. 
In his book Music, Value and the Passions, Aaron Ridley argues that the 
association between music and various affective states need not be merely 
subjective, or a matter simply of convention, but can be grounded in the 
resemblance which music may bear to the human voice and the expressive 
movements of bodies, especially the human body. Hence he sees vocal and 
dynamic "melisma" as the key to music's expressiveness.8 Following 
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Ridley, I shall take dynamic melisma as the more important case, and con-
fine my comments to this case. 
To illustrate dynamic melisma, Ridley considers the first eight bars of 
the funeral march in Beethoven's Eroica symphony, and in this connection 
he takes issue with Donald Ferguson's reading of this same passage for 
reasons that have some bearing on our topic. Ferguson writes: "Grief per-
meates every note and every rhythmic step; but there is no yielding - no 
indulgence in the alleviating misery of tears. It comprehends heroically 
and is unafraid."" While acknowledging the sensitivity of Ferguson's 
account to the particular movements and tensions of the passage, Ridley 
objects that he over-describes the music in rather the way that it would be 
over-described if we took the music to recount the movements of a beetle 
struggling to push some dung over a series of mounds. Both the case of the 
beetle and the case picked out by Ferguson's description, Ridley argues, fit 
the music to the extent that both involve movements of the kind that are 
embodied in the music, that is, movements that suggest "perseverance, for-
titude, firmness" and other such qualities. lO But the music falls short of 
identifying particular states of affairs of the kind that we would require to 
weave a story around such movements. Clearly, the music stops short of 
describing a beetle; but on Ridley's view, it also lacks the kind of represen-
tational power that is presupposed in Ferguson's account, and specifically 
it lacks the capacity to represent the thought that someone has suffered a 
loss, a thought which Ridley takes to be necessary if a state of mind is to 
count as grief. Hence Ridley writes that while Ferguson's description of the 
music as "slow," "heavy," "effortful," and so on, may carry conviction: 
his claim that" grief permeates every note" cannot be justified in the 
same way; for the difference between grief and profound sadness is 
that grief quite specifically involves the loss of something loved, and 
the movements of music could never suggest that. l1 
To this it may be objected: even if a piece of music cannot express Mary's 
grieving (because it cannot represent individuals), why should it not express 
grief considered abstractly? Ridley's position here turns on the thought that 
the expressive power of a piece such as the funeral march is grounded in the 
resemblance between its movements and the expressive movements of bod-
ies. So his claim that the march cannot express grief as distinct from pro-
found sadness comes down to this thought: either these two states cannot be 
differentiated from one another simply by reference to the patterns of 
expressive behaviour with which each is associated, or if they can be so dif-
ferentiated, then the movements of a piece of music fail to present any correl-
ative distinction. Ridley endorses this thought, I suggest, because he thinks 
that grief can be distinguished from profound sadness only by introducing 
an element of narrative. For whereas profound sadness need have no narra-
tive component (a person can just feel sad, where this sadness has no partic-
ular reference), grief involves reference to the sustaining of a loss. And our 
expressive behaviour (or at any rate expressive behaviour of the kind that 
can bear a resemblance to the movements of a piece of music) is not suffi-
ciently discriminating, he thinks, to pick out this narrative structure. 
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Similarly, we might suppose that envy, remorse and embarrassment, for 
instance, all have a narrative component: if I feel envy, then I construe 
someone as enjoying a benefit, and (as Roberts notes) various prospective 
actions are likely to be implied thereby; and if I feel remorse, then I construe 
myself as having done wrong, and at least implicitly commit myself to 
righting the wrong if the opportunity should arise; and if I feel embarrass-
ment, then I construe myself as being in a condition that may lower my 
standing in the eyes of others, and at ll~ast implicitly I am committed to 
removing this condition if able to do so. Ridley's view, then, is that music 
cannot express emotions of these kinds; for they are defined by their narra-
tive E,tructure, and this structure can only be picked out by reference to par-
ticular states of affairs, and these states of affairs cannot be identified simply 
by reference to patterns of expressive behaviour. Hence, he proposes, music 
expresses not so much emotions as what are commonly called "moods," 
that is, affective states shorn of any reference to particular states of affairs. 
Among moods, we may include melancholy, sadness, elation and joy, 
where these states infuse our experience of the world in some relatively 
general way, rather than having a specific state of affairs as their target. 
Ridley chooses to define such states as "feelings." Feelings, he notes, 
lack "material objects" (that is, concrete objects), but they do have "formal 
objects." For example, if I get out of bed and feel a generalised depression, 
then there is nothing in particular about which I am depressed (my affec-
tive state has no material or concrete object); instead, things in general are 
felt to fall under the description "profoundly unpromising" (where this 
description gives the formal object of depression)Y Such states of feeling, 
Ridley comments, may "colour our world." And if we wish to think of 
them taking a material object, then that object may best be thought of as 
simply "the world."14 
So far we have seen that Ridley subscribes to these two claims: "pure" 
music expresses affective states by virtue of the resemblance between its 
movements and the expressive movements of bodies, especially the human 
body; and accordingly, music can express "feelings" or moods but not 
"emotions," since it cannot pick out the particular states of affairs (involv-
ing loss, wrong-doing or whatever it may be) which serve to differentiate 
the emotions. There is one further aspect of Ridley'S account that I wish to 
introduce for present purposes. Ridley wonders how it is that we manage 
to recognise the resemblance between the movements of a piece of music 
and the movements of human beings or other creaturesY He notes that 
sometimes we can register in a purely dispassionate way how the dynamic 
qualities of a piece of music resemble the bodily movements of (for exam-
ple) human beings, where these movements are expressive of feeling. 
(Perhaps rather unhelpfully, he speaks of this as a "robotic" recognition of 
the resemblance; in other words, it is the sort of recognition that does not 
depend upon the quality of our felt response to the music.) But often, he 
suggests, particularly with unfamiliar pieces, we come to identify the states 
of feeling expressed in the music by virtue of our affective responses. This 
sort of recognition involves a mirroring response to the music, so that the 
character of the music's expressiveness is grasped by way of the feeling 
that it engenders in us: 
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It is rather like my coming to appreciate the melancholy of a weeping 
willow only as the willow saddens me: I could, of course, merely 
identify the expressive posture that the willow's posture resembles; 
but instead I apprehend its melancholy through a kind of mirroring 
response. I respond to it sympathetically.!6 
It is worth emphasising that Ridley is not endorsing a simple "arousal" 
account of the expressiveness of music. What makes a piece of music 
"sad," for example, is not that it typically arouses in its listeners a response 
of sadness. On the contrary, it is the fact that the music is sad that explains 
why it gives rise to this sort of response. Its sadness is to be understood 
then not in terms of the affects it arouses, but in terms of the resemblance 
between the music's dynamic qualities and the movements of bodies 
where these movements are expressive of sadness. So the expressiveness of 
a piece of music consists not in the fact that it simply calls to mind certain 
states of feeling (the "robotic" case), nor in the fact that it causes certain 
states of feeling (the mirroring response case), but in the fact of resem-
blance between the movements of music and the expressive movements of 
bodies, where this resemblance can in principle be grasped either sympa-
thetically or dispassionately. 
We have seen that on Ridley's view, while music is capable of expressing 
for instance sadness, it cannot express grief, or we might add pity, since 
these emotions are individuated by reference to particular states of affairs, 
and music lacks the representational power to pick out particular states of 
affairs. This might suggest that music can express at most a relatively inde-
terminate kind of affective state - sadness in general rather than a particu-
lar variety of sadness such as grief or pity. However, Ridley adds that 
where the expressive force of a piece of music is recognised by means of a 
mirroring response, then its expressiveness assumes a very precise charac-
ter, which can be specified by reference to the particular episode of feeling 
that the listener experiences: here the music is taken to express not just sad-
ness, but the kind of sadness which has precisely this phenomenological 
feel. In this way, Ridley feels able to endorse Mendelssohn's often cited 
remark that "a piece of music that I love expresses thoughts to me that are 
not too imprecise to be framed in words, but too precise."!7 Of course, in 
elaborating his theory in this way, Ridley is after all endorsing a form, albeit 
a "weak" form, of the arousal theory: in general terms, it is the resemblance 
between the movements of music and of the body which grounds the possi-
bility of music's expressiveness, but it is by virtue of our felt responses that 
we are able to ascribe to music a really precise expressive significance (a sig-
nificance which may exceed our powers of description).!8 Ridley insists, 
however, that these felt responses, which enable us to attribute to music a 
very particular expressive force, are not merely conventional, or based on 
personal associations of some kind, but grounded in the character of the 
music itself, and above all in its dynamic melismatic properties. 
I turn now to examine, more briefly, another account of musical expres-
siveness, one which is broadly in agreement with Ridley's approach. Like 
Ridley, Stephen Davies addresses his remarks to the claim of Eduard 
Hanslick and others that music cannot express definite emotions because it 
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cannot capture the thoughts of which they are constituted, and that a 
music critic should therefore take no interest in the affective responses 
aroused by a piece of music.19 As we have seen, Ridley responds to this 
proposal by supposing that not all affective states need be counted as emo-
tions, and that music expresses moods or feelings, rather than emotions in 
the strict sense. Davies also thinks that reference to objectless affective 
states provides the best way of turning aside Hanslick's challenge, and like 
Ridley he makes reference to weeping willows, and also to the face of St 
Bernard dogs, to explain how something may be expressive of an affective 
state, without our having to suppose that this state is directed at a particu-
lar state of affairs, or that it is felt at a11.20 Like weeping willows and St 
Bernard dogs, Davies suggests, music is expressive because it presents 
"emotion characteristics in appearance" (in other words, because it cap-
tures the look we associate with various states of emotion).21 However, 
whereas the willow is expressive because of its shape, music is expressive 
on account of its dynamic character, and the resemblance this bears to 
hum'ill beings' gait, bearing, carriage and so on. 
Moreover, like Ridley, Davies supposes that music sometimes arouses the 
affective states of which it is expressive (though again like Ridley, he rejects 
simple forms of the arousal theory: the expressive force of a piece of music is 
not to be reduced to its tendency to arouse a given affective response in its 
listeners.) Moreover, he maintains that these mirroring feelings remain 
"uncluttered by the motives, desires, and the need to act that are their usual 
accompaniments."22 Again, this is not least because the feelings in question 
lack a material object, and are therefore abstracted from the specificity of 
context that usually underpins the action-guiding character of an affective 
state. (Compare Roberts on envy.) We can explain in the same way the com-
parative mildness of the feelings aroused by music, in so far as relatively 
intense affective episodes are typically informed by beliefs about particular 
states of affairs. Lastly, Davies echoes Ridley'S thought that the affective 
states expressed in music can infuse our experience in general. Hence he 
comments that because the feelings expressed in music lack material objects, 
they can be taken to express "the composer's experience of affective life in 
general."23 However, Davies notes that, even so, a mirroring response to 
music is not simply an objectless mood. It is true that such responses may 
lack an "emotional object" (for instance, when I am moved to sadness I need 
not be sad about anything in particular), but they still have a perceptual 
object (the music itself).24 Hence they are like perceptual object generated 
moods (see again the examples of the willow and 5t Bernard). 
So Davies' account is broadly in agreement with Ridley's. There are some 
differences of emphasis, however. Notably Davies does not give much atten-
tion to Mendelssohn's thought about the precision and consequent ineffabili-
ty of the feelings expressed in music. But when he does make reference to 
this idea, citing Mendelssohn, he does not dispute the suggestion that the 
affects aroused in mirroring responses to music may escape verbalisation; he 
just rejects the idea that this feature of musical experience is distinctive or of 
any importance for understanding its expressive power: "the most mundane 
perceptual experiences," he writes, "lead to the acquisition of ineffable truths 
- for example, that the apple in front of me has a distinctive hue. Such facts 
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are usually of no special importance. They do not comprise inexpressible 
knowledge of a type that anyone is likely to feel compelled or inspired to 
communicate."25 So while Davies does not dispute Ridley's claim about the 
particularity of our responses, he does not assign this fact the same signifi-
cance in understanding the expressive force of music. 
In summary, the works of Ridley and Davies reveal a striking consensus 
on the following issues. Firstly, the affective states expressed in music lack 
material objects. To put the matter in Davies's terms, they are states of the 
kind that can be communicated by an emotion characteristic in appear-
ance, and therefore states which can in principle be expressed by some-
one's (dynamic) appearance without our knowing what he or she is think-
ing. Accordingly, both authors suppose that "pure" music cannot express, 
for instance, remorse, embarrassment, or envy, but can express sadness 
and happiness. Moreover, since they lack material objects, the affective 
states expressed in music are capable in principle of suffusing our experi-
ence in general, or "colouring our world." And while they reject simple 
arousal theories of musical expressiveness, Ridley and Davies also agree 
that we often come to recognise the expressive significance of a piece of 
music by way of a mirroring response, where this response may be too 
precise to be captured in all its particularity in words. 
It is worth noting that similar themes emerge in some other, rather dif-
ferent responses to the claim that music cannot express particular emotions 
because it cannot express the thoughts of which they are constituted. For 
example, Geoffrey Maddell has argued that the affective states expressed 
in music do after all have a "material" or "emotional" object, namely, the 
movements of the music itself, and accordingly music is capable of 
expressing emotions in the everyday sense: 
It is false that music can evoke emotion only if it can represent some 
extra-musical object of that emotion. The object of desire, or quasi-
longing, is not some extra-musical state of affairs, but a feature of the 
music itself, viz., the resolution on the tonic. That is not a state of 
affairs which is represented by the music; it is a feature of the music.26 
Although adopting this rather different theoretical framework (one which 
takes the music to have a material object supplied by the tonal and har-
monic features of the work itself, and which has no use for the idea that 
music bears a resemblance to human expressive behaviour), Maddell still 
endorses two of the themes that we have identified in the work of Davies 
and Ridley. He agrees that we often recognise the expressive force of a 
piece of music by way of a mirroring or sympathetic response;27 and he 
agrees that "the distinctive balance of intentional affective responses 
evoked by music may be too subtle for words to capture."28 
Finally, it is worth casting some of these observations about the charac-
ter of the affective states expressed in music in the terms provided by 
Roberts' theory. In particular, we might ask how Roberts' account may be 
applied to the mirroring responses that are central to the discussions of 
Ridley and Davies. Although Roberts does not allude to moods in the 
paper I expounded earlier, these responses can be treated as concernful 
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construals, I suggest, albeit that "moody" concerns and construals are dis-
tinctive since they make no reference to particular states of affairs. For 
instance, a listener who responds sympathetically to a piece of music may 
find herself feeling an object-less depression, whereby things in general are 
taken to be profoundly unpromising, without any particular state of affairs 
being picked out in these terms, or treated as an object of concern. 
As we have seen, because mirroring responses fail to identify particular 
states of affairs, we should also expect any concomitant concerns to be rela-
tively mild. Ridley provides a further perspective on this thought when 
considering the question of why people should choose to listen to sad 
music. (After all, who would want to experience a mirroring response of 
sadness?) To meet this difficulty he suggests that emotions such as grief, 
humiliation, shame and jealousy are all necessarily unpleasant for their 
subjects, because they all necessarily involve reference to some sort of diffi-
culty or reversal in the subject's circumstances. By contrast, he comments, 
the affective states experienced in mirroring responses to music make no 
reference to the subject's circumstances, and are therefore not necessarily 
unpieasanU9 Hence the concerns which arise in this connection will tend to 
be rdatively mild, for they will lack the element of frustrated self-regard 
that is characteristic of states such as humiliation. For the same sorts of rea-
son, to revert to a point made by Davies, we may expect mirroring 
responses to lack the action-guiding force that is typical of affective states 
which pick out a particular context, and to be devoid of the powerful sen-
sations that accompany certain emotions. Lastly, mirroring responses may 
also be said to be "serious" in Roberts' sense, in so far as things in general 
have the appearance of being (for example) profoundly unpromising, even 
if the subject of the experience would decline to assert that this is in fact 
how things stand. 
III. The religious power of music 
Drawing upon the work of Ridley and Davies, we have seen that there is a 
degree of consensus on the character of the affective states which can be 
expressed in music. The following claims seem to be especially significant 
for an account of the religious significance of music: 
(1) Music is expressive of (material) object-less or mood-like affec-
tive states. 
(2) The expressive force of a musical work can be appreciated by 
way of a sympathetic response, whereby the listener takes on 
the affective state herself. 
(3) The affective states expressed in music may be too precise to be 
identified in all their particularity in words. 
(4) The affects that are evoked in sympathetic responses to music 
are lacking in self-reference and (as Davies puts it) "uncluttered 
by the motives, desires, and the need to act that are their usual 
accompaniments." 
I shall explore the implications of (1)-(4) in tum, with a view to identifying 
THE RELIGIOUS POTENCY OF MUSIC 33 
several distinct respects in which music may be said to bear a religious 
significance. 
Following Ridley, we may distinguish between "feelings" (in his sense, 
i.e. affective states which lack a material object) and the "quality of an affec-
tive life."30 The quality of a person's affective life has to do with the kinds of 
affective response to which they are predisposed in general, that is, regard-
less of the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. For 
instance, if the affective tone of my life is one of timidity, then I will tend to 
construe the world as threatening, and will be predisposed therefore to 
experience episodes of fear. Hence the quality of a person's affective life 
amounts to a kind of implicit Weltanschauung, that is, a sense of the signifi-
cance of the world, where this sense may well lack any theoretical articula-
tion. Now a person who is experiencing a "feeling" of timidity resembles 
someone whose quality of affective life is timorous to this extent: while the 
mood lasts, he will be inclined to construe his environment in general as 
threatening. In so far therefore as music is expressive of "feelings" in 
Ridley'S sense, it is also expressive of something like a world-view, that is, 
an affectively laden way of reading the significance of things in general. 
Now the religions are, of course, typically concerned to inculcate world-
views of this kind, in so far as they seek to promote some generalised, 
affectively toned sense of the significance of human experience, a sense 
that extends not just to this set of circumstances or that, but to a person's 
life in its entirety. This is part of what is involved, for example, in stories of 
creation and the end-time: such stories serve to frame human experience in 
an utterly general way, so providing a larger context in terms of which we 
can assess the significance of the particular states of affairs with which we 
reckon in day-to-day living. Suppose for instance that a faith tradition 
emphasises the operation of divine providence in the workings of the 
world. Such a tradition will find a state of habitual timidity inappropriate 
(at any rate where such fearfulness is directed at the way things tum out in 
the world); and accordingly, we would expect members of this tradition to 
aspire to a rather different quality of affective life, one marked by a greater 
degree of confidence in the workings of the world. 
Contrary to the spirit of this example, some commentators have supposed 
that it is generalised affects that come first, and that metaphYSical systems 
can be "read off" from such affects. For example, Pierre Hadot has argued 
that the ancient schools of philosophy were concerned with "philosophical 
discourse" (an abstract, metaphYSical account of the nature of things) only in 
so far as such discourse helped to foster an affectively toned sense of the 
meaning of things whose appropriateness was already evident. Hence he 
suggests that the basic Stoic attitude was one of "tension" and "duty" or vig-
ilance, and the Epicurean attitude one of "serenity" and the "joy of exist-
ing."31 (These attitudes we can interpret as "feelings," I suggest.) And he pro-
poses that the Stoic and Epicurean metaphYSical systems were constructed 
simply for the sake of instilling general attitudes of these kinds. In a similar 
vein, William James has argued that metaphysical perspectives are answer-
able to prior affective orientations of a general character. He notes, for exam-
ple, that any metaphYSical system which required an attitude to everxday 
experience of fear, disgust, despair and doubt would be unsustainable. For 
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the purposes of our discussion, there is no need to resolve this dispute about 
the priority of the quality of an affective life vis-a-vis a metaphysical world-
view. It is enough to note that there is a close relationship between the two, 
in whichever direction the dependence nms. (Indeed, it seems most likely 
that there will be a degree of reciprocal influence.) 
So here is a first respect in which musical expressiveness proves to be 
religiously significant: the religions seek to inculcate a certain quality of 
affective life, and the affective states expressed in music (because they lack 
material objects) can be taken to represent various qualities of affective life. 
Moreover - turning now to the second point on our list - it is not just 
that music enables us to identify abstractly various ways of apprehending 
the world in general from an affective point of view. On the contrary, in so 
far as the expressiveness of a piece of music is grasped by way of a mirror-
ing response, we will find ourselves experiencing first hand the correlative 
"feeling" or mood. Ridley puts the point thus: 
Music, then, ... can be expressive of attitudes. For in coming, through 
certain pieces of music, to grasp the dominant character of an affective 
life not our own, we may also become aware of the attitude toward 
the world embodied in it, as the attitude inherent in the feeling which, 
sympathetically, we experience. Thus, in grasping the dominant affec-
tive character of Beethoven's Eighth Symphony we become aware of 
what it would be like to have a cheerful outlook on the world, what it 
would be like to think the world amenable and uplifting." 
So musical expressiveness is religiously relevant not only in so far as it 
reveals various possible qualities of affective life, but also because the "feel-
ings" expressed in music can be apprehended in such a way that we come 
to know "from inside" what it is like to have such feelings. Accordingly, 
music can shape the quality of our own affective response to the world in 
new ways, at any rate while the mood engendered by the music lasts. 
We might ask next whether musical experience can also effect a more 
enduring transformation of a person's affective sensibility. Here it is worth 
recalling Roberts' comments on how the emotions fall within our control in 
so far as we are free to choose which construal of a situation to adopt. Now, 
as we have seen, in so far as they are mood-like, mirroring responses to 
music present us with various general construals of things. And according-
ly, by drawing various construals to our attention, and allowing us to adopt 
them first hand for a time, mirroring responses to music may enlarge our 
repertoire of generalised construals of the world; and thereby they may 
help us to make a choice between various such construals. It is also possible 
that if we are exposed to a given construal often enough, through our 
immersion in a particular musical tradition, then adopting that construal 
may become to some degree habitual, independently of any deliberate exer-
cise of choice. In this way, a person may find themselves drawn into a cer-
tain quality of affective life simply by virtue of their participation in a musi-
cal tradition. It may be that we can understand this phenomenon in part by 
reference to Roberts' comments on how a sensation (such as blushing) may 
lead it person to construe their situation in a way that conforms to the sensa-
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tion. Analogously, we might suppose that if a person finds themselves (at 
all frequently) in the position of construing things in general as, for exam-
ple, "amenable" and "uplifting" (on account of a mirroring response to 
music), then they may be led to suppose, perhaps somewhat unreflectively, 
that this is indeed the nature of their circumstances. 
So far I have been talking about the in principle relevance of musical 
expressiveness to religious concerns without any consideration of how an 
explicitly religious context may contribute to the expressiveness of music. If 
we follow the analysis of Ridley and Davies, we shall have to say that the 
expressiveness of a particular piece (played in a certain way) will not vary 
across secular and religious contexts, for both authors are insistent that 
expressiveness is a property of the music itself (relating above all to its 
dynamic properties). However, context may make a difference to the way in 
which a piece is played, and where several such interpretations are equally 
valid, but give rise to differences of dynamic property, we may suppose 
that context can indirectly make a difference to musical expressiveness. But 
quite apart from its contribution to expressiveness, a change of context may 
of course make a difference to the kinds of affect which the listener is likely 
to experience; for a listener's affective state may reflect both their mirroring 
response to qualities inherent in the music and also the setting in which the 
music is heard. An explicitly religious setting can also ensure that the gener-
al construals that are typical of mirroring responses are interpreted in new 
ways, without necessarily making any difference to the quality of feeling 
aroused by the music. For example, in listening to the AgllllS Dei of a Byrd 
mass, I may experience a generalised feeling of peace, and if the music is 
heard in its liturgical context, or if the words are given serious considera-
tion, then this feeling can be assigned a precise, religious meaning: the 
peace I feel is a peace befitting my situation as one whose sins have been 
taken away. Here the more detailed construal supplied by the words, or by 
the larger religious context, does not change the particular, mood-like quali-
ty of the mirroring response, but it enables me to see that generalised feeling 
as befitting a particular state of affairs, albeit one that is seen to call for a per-
vasive transformation in my sense of the world. 
So we should expect to find certain differences between the secular 
music-lover listening to a Byrd mass while sipping a cocktail and someone 
who listens to the mass with devotion in a liturgical setting. The first per-
son may not adopt a mirroring response to the music at all, and even if 
they do, their response may be overlaid by other, less religiously sugges-
tive affects drawn from their context (the sense of peace may be transmut-
ed into a sense of bodily well-being, for example). And even if the secular 
music-lover does adopt a mirroring response, and this response is not 
overlaid by other, less religiously resonant affects, they will presumably 
fail to assign the response the particular meaning that it bears in its original 
context: the generalised feeling of peace will not be understood as appro-
priate in the light of our status as forgiven. 
By way of contrast with the secular music-lover, consider this religious-
ly informed response to music: 
I entered the little Portuguese village .... It was the evening and there 
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was a full moon. It was by the sea. The wives of the fishermen were 
going in procession to make a tour of all the ships, carrying candles 
and singing what must certainly be very ancient hymns of a heart-
rending sadness .... There the conviction was suddenly borne in upon 
me that Christianity is the religion of slaves, that slaves cannot help 
belonging to it, and I among others.34 
In this passage, Simone Weil is describing an episode of musical experience 
that has, clearly, a religious context. She takes the hymns she hears to express 
"heart-rending sadness," and this, we may suppose, is the "feeling" (in 
Ridley's sense) which she experiences by way of a mirroring response to the 
music. And she assigns this feeling a specifically religious meaning, influ-
enced no doubt in part by the religious context, and also by her own preoc-
cupations: this feeling reveals a quality of affective life that befits "slaves," 
and this is indeed how we ought to feel, she says, if we are Christians. 
Significantly, Weil's identification with Christianity here proceeds initially 
not by reference to some abstract credal characterisation of what Christians 
stand for, but by reference to the "attitude" (of "slavery") that she takes to 
typify the Christian life. To this extent, the passage seems to endorse the 
thought, one we have explored already, that the quality of affective life incul-
cated by a religious tradition is central to the identity of the tradition, and not 
merely derivative from its theoretical, dogmatic claims. 
Having considered the secular music-lover and Simone Weil, I offer one 
final example of how music may be appreciated, of a rather different char-
acter again: 
Suppose that a captive in his prison, delivered to hatred and seeing 
the sky only "beyond the rooftop," hears a Bach fugue .... He can not 
doubt that this world of Bach exists, even if it is reserved for enjoy-
ment by others. There is joy, and it is of little importance which par-
ticular objects manifest it.35 
Drawing again on the Ridley-Davies framework, we may suppose that the 
captive recognises the expressive force of the music by way of a mirroring 
response of joy. And the joy he experiences is, we may think, a "feeling"-
hence he can remark that "it is of little importance which particular objects 
manifest [this joy]," implying that it does not have a particular material 
object, and is instead free to range over an indeterminate range of such 
objects (indeed what is there in his immediate environment that might 
serve as its object?) This case seems to fall somewhere between those of the 
cocktail-sipping secularist and Weil. The captive enters into the mirroring 
response with real seriousness, since he takes the response to reveal some-
thing important about the possibilities of human experience. But he does 
not commit himself to the thought that the affect he comes to feel has any 
general application in human life. By contrast, in a religiously engaged 
hearing of Byrd's Agnus Dei or the hymns in Weil's example, the listener 
not only enters into the mirroring response (of peace or heart-rending sad-
ne~'S) with a certain gravity, but takes the correlative quality of affective life 
to be appropriate for human beings. So the listener described in this pas-
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sage remains, it seems, religiously unengaged (or at any rate, if this 
response involves a kind of spiritual-cum-religious engagement, it is less 
far-reaching than that found in our other examples, because it does not 
involve some general conception of the human condition and the quality of 
affective life that befits this condition). But at the same time, because his 
reading of the mirroring response reveals a degree of existential serious-
ness, the captive's appreciation of the music is also to be distinguished 
from that of the cocktail sipper. 
Before proceeding to consider, more briefly, points (3) and (4) on our list 
of themes drawn from Ridley and Davies, it is worth noting that the fea-
tures of musical expressiveness that we have been discussing appear to be 
somewhat distinctive of music. For example, because of their richer powers 
of representation, a story or painting may well engender an affective state 
that is targeted at some rather restricted state of affairs. Even stories con-
cerning God, the source and goal of the whole creation, can be construed in 
this relatively limited way, we may suppose, so that they engender pat-
terns of felt response to God considered as a particular object, rather than 
giving rise to a more general affective disposition. To this extent, non-
musical art forms may lack the sort of religious relevance that we have 
been ascribing to music, that is, the relevance that derives from the general-
isable character of the affects expressed in music. 
Moreover, again because of their richer representational content, non-
musical art forms may well result in an empathic rather than a sympathetic 
or mirroring response. For instance, if a story describes a person's grief 
upon being bereaved, my response may well involve pity for this person 
(and will not normally involve grief, in so far as I do not take myself to be 
bereaved). By contrast, when my response is of the mirroring kind, I take 
on the very affects which are expressed in the work. It may be that this fea-
ture of musical expressiveness is also important in understanding the dis-
tinctive character of music's religious relevance. At any rate, a mirroring 
response can seem more intimate than an empathic response: the latter 
kind of response directs my attention towards some more or less precisely 
circumscribed state of affairs (the grieving person, for example); by con-
trast, a mirroring response appears to be simply a state of inwardness, one 
which does not require me to feel joyful or depressed (or whatever) about 
anything in particular. The depth of emotional experience that many peo-
ple associate with music, in distinction from other art forms, is, at least in 
part, I suggest, a consequence of this aspect of musical experience, where-
by we simply mirror the movements of the music, rather than directing our 
attention to an emotional object (something we are sad or happy about). 
(Compare T.5. Eliot's remark: "You are the music while the music lasts.")36 
If music does indeed speak to us with a special intimacy for these reasons, 
that suggests once more that musical expressiveness may be particularly 
important for the formation of a certain quality of affective life. 
Point (3) on our list of the religiously significant features of musical 
expressiveness recalled Ridley's claim that the affects expressed in music, 
when grasped in a mirroring response, may exceed our powers of verb ali-
sation. It is easy to imagine an objector protesting that Ridley has failed to 
show how this sort of expressiveness is really grounded in the music. After 
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all, on his own account, the resemblance between the dynamic qualities of 
a piece of music and the expressive movements of bodies will be of a fairly 
indeterminate character, enough to allow us to characterise the music as 
say slow and effortful, and therefore sad, but prohibiting any more precise 
identification of its expressive significance. However, suppose we grant 
Ridley's claim that such mirroring responses are a mode of apprehension 
of qualities in the music, and that capturing their expressive significance in 
full may well exceed our powers of description. If he is right about this, 
then a further dimension of music's religious potency comes into view. For 
on these assumptions, it is at least possible that some religiously important 
affects can be grasped by way of mirroring responses to music, but not by 
verbal means.37 Indeed, it may be that certain religiously important affects 
can be grasped only by way of a particular musical tradition, or even, only 
by way of a particular piece of music. In that case, music could prove to be 
indispensable for the full articulation of the meaning of a religious tradi-
tion considered in terms of the quality of affective life that it commends. 
Readers can no doubt test this thesis against their own musical experience. 
Are there pieces of music, or traditions of musical expression, that commu-
nicate a quality of affective life, where at least part of what is communicat-
ed is relevant to the "attitude" that (say) Christians should display, and 
where what is communicated in this respect cannot be expressed in all its 
religiously relevant detail in any other way? 
I tum now to point (4) on our list, the idea that the affects expressed in 
music are lacking in self-reference and "uncluttered" by any impulse 
towards action. There is, of course, a long-standing tradition which has 
found aesthetic experience religiously or spiritually significant because it 
fosters a kind of detachment, encouraging us to be absorbed in the work of 
art for its own sake, and apart from any thought of its usefulness in satisfy-
ing the cravings of the ego.3Il Ridley and Davies together provide a way of 
articulating the idea that musical experience can free a person from self-ref-
erential concerns, though their account makes appeal not so much to the 
character of aesthetic experience in general, as to the character of perceptu-
al object directed moods. Hence Ridley notes, as we have seen, that mirror-
ing responses to music necessarily lack any self-regarding character, 
because they fail to pick out particular circumstances and their bearing on 
the well-being of the subject. And for the same reason, we should expect to 
find (as we evidently do) that musical affects are typically devoid of action-
guiding content: a mirroring response to the sadness expressed in a piece 
of music makes no reference to particular states of affairs, and therefore 
invites no thought about how I might effect some change in things. 
In these respects, we may well detect a further religiously suggestive 
feature of musical expressiveness. For in so far as musical affects have this 
character, then they involve a "transcending" of the ego-centric, action-
guiding perspective of ordinary life, and this sort of transcendence may be 
religiously important, in so far as the religions think it appropriate (not in 
every circumstance, evidently) to adopt a contemplative attitude towards 
the world, that is, an attitude that does not see the world as an object of 
use, or take it as a resource for satisfying my desires. It is also worth recall-
ing here the idea that the affects experienced in mirroring responses to 
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music are typically mild in character. The mildness of musical affects 
might also be deemed spiritually significant in some religious traditions, in 
so far as extremes of emotion are considered unwholesome. But it seems 
likely that the censuring of powerful emotions that is characteristic of some 
religious traditions derives from a sense that such emotions are grounded 
in egocentric concerns. And in that case, the mildness of musical affects 
will not present a distinct consideration after all. 
So far I have been exploring the religious relevance of musical affects in 
so far as such affects help to foster the adoption of religiously appropriate 
"attitudes" towards the world. Next, and more briefly, I would like to con-
sider the possibility that musical affects may be religiously relevant in 
helping to cultivate a certain quality of affective life in relationship to God 
(or the sacred otherwise characterised). 
IV. Extending the model 
I have been considering the religious importance of musical affects consid-
ered as attitudes towards the world. But on some views, our attitudes 
towards the world and towards God ought to be in some degree mutually 
defining. And if that is so, then we should reckon with the possibility that 
musical affects are directly relevant to a person's relationship to God (and 
not relevant merely in so far as they suggest an attitude towards the world 
that is religiously fitting). This association between the attitudes which are 
apt in relationship to God and in relationship to the world arises most sim-
ply in so far as the world is considered as a theatre of divine activity, and 
therefore revelatory of God. A particularly striking example of this sort of 
approach is evident in Maimonides' treatment of the divine attributes. 
Hence he writes that: 
We see, e.g., how well He provides for the life of the embryo of living 
beings; how He endows with certain faculties both the embryo itself 
and those who have to rear it after its birth, in order that it may be 
protected from death and destruction, guarded against all harm, and 
assisted in the performance of all that is required [for its develop-
ment]. Similar acts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emo-
tion and tenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to 
be merciful.'9 
Maimonides goes on to generalise this example to reach the conclusion that 
"all attributes ascribed to God are attributes of His acts."40 Or more exactly 
(as becomes clear later in his discussion), he proposes that the divine attrib-
utes involve either a reference to God's effects in the world (as in the pas-
sage just cited) or (where they concern the divine essence in itself) a denial 
of certain creaturely properties of God.41 So on this account, many of the 
divine attributes can be read as compressed references to the way the 
world works in general (in terms of the preservation of embryos, and so 
on). And accordingly, in some cases at least, affective attitudes will be 
transferable from God to the world, and vice versa. For example, if it is 
appropriate to have confidence in the divine mercy, then it is appropriate 
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to have confidence in the workings of the world, since God's being merci-
ful comes down to the fact that the world works in certain ways. And in 
that case, it seems possible that certain musical affects, in so far as they 
imply a religiously appropriate attitude towards the world, will also there-
by imply an appropriate attitude towards God. 
It might be objected that this is to commend an idolatrous interpretation 
of the signjficance of music: we are being invited to transfer attitudes that 
are appropriate to the world to God; and these attihldes, furthermore, are 
seen to have their origin in music, and not in some acknowledgement of 
God and what God has done for us. On the first of these points, I would 
agree, of course, that not every attitude towards the world will be applica-
ble to God. Following Maimonides, I am suggesting that a theological 
rationale can be provided for treating some attitudes in this way. 
Specifically, if we follow Maimonides, then we may suppose that having 
confidence in God's mercy logically commits a person to having confi-
dence in the world's progress, because God's mercy is realised in his direc-
tion of the world. On the second point, I would recall what was said earlier 
about the contribution of religious context to our appreciation of music. 
Given such a context, it is possible to assign a precise religious meaning to 
a mirroring response to music, a meaning which does recognise what God 
has done for us. 
For an example of a musically induced "feeling" being applied to God, 
we may turn to John Paul II's "Letter to Artists."·2 The Pope writes that: "In 
song, faith is experienced as vibrant joy, love, and confident expectation of 
the saving intervention of God." Cast in the terms we have been using, we 
could take John Paul to be saying that the "feelings" of joy and love can be 
aroused by way of a mirroring response to music. And (reading our own 
theory into his remarks somewhat) we might suppose that these feelings 
are appropriate both as "attitudes" towards the world and in relationship 
to God, because of certain specifically Christian truths. Thus because of 
what we know of "the saving intervention of God," our everyday experi-
ence should be received in a spirit of love and joy; and these same affects 
should also be displayed in relationship to God, not least because it is God 
who confers this sort of significance upon our everyday experience. Here 
the applicability of an affective attitude both in relationship to the world 
and in relationship to God is grounded not so much in general truths con-
cerning God's activity in the world (as in Maimonides) as in a specifically 
Christian claim concerning the ultimate telos of human existence. 
Remarkably, there is a whole tradition of spiritual formation which 
seems to be founded upon the idea that such mood-like responses should 
infonn our relationship to God. I am thinking here of an approach to spiri-
tual direction that was widespread in Catholic circles at least until the mid-
dle years of the last century. In this tradition, it was common practice to 
distinguish various phases of spiritual development (broadly, the purga-
tive, illuminative and unitive) and to suppose that the later phases were 
marked by a movement away from discursive forms of prayer towards a 
state of wordless, affective contemplation. Expounding this general tradi-
tion in a text which served as a standard spiritual handbook in the early 
year5 of the twentieth century, Adolphe Tanquerey writes that, as it 
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matures, "the soul seeks solitude and silence; it gradually builds in the 
heart a sanctuary where it finds God and converses with Him heart to 
heart."43 In keeping with the larger spiritual tradition of which he is speak-
ing, Tanquerey supposes that in this intimate relationship to God, one par-
ticular affective state will come to predominate. And the resulting condi-
tion, he writes, "soon extends to our whole life" so that it "persists all day 
long," whatever else we may be doing.44 Here Tanquerey seems to have in 
mind a mood-like condition, to the extent that the predominant affect 
extends to our experience in general; and it is through such "moods," he is 
suggesting, that a person may converse with God "heart to heart." So here 
we find a further way of taking "feelings" to be important in a person's 
relationship to God, and accordingly a further way of developing the 
thought that musical affects are at least in principle religiously significant. 
Tanquerey's characterisation of these predominant affects as mood-like 
suggests that they should inform not only our relationship to God but also 
our dealings with the world (since they will persist through our day-to-day 
activities). This suggests that Tanquerey's discussion, like the others we 
have examined, invites, in certain cases, an association of the attitudes 
applicable to God and those applicable to the world. And there is implicit in 
his account a theological rationale for this association. In particular, he notes 
that the character of the dominant affective state will vary from person to 
person, and that for some the focal point of this state will be Christ's pas-
sion, and for others the eucharist, and so on.'5 This suggests that the 
eucharist, the passion, or some other cardinal truth of the Christian faith is 
taken to disclose the ultimate significance of human experience; and for this 
reason, certain attitudes (joy, for example) can be deemed appropriate not 
only in our relationship to God but also in our engagement with the world. 
Conclusions 
Schopenhauer famously thought that music carries metaphysical signifi-
cance because the movements of a melody offer a kind of analogue for the 
movements of the will as it seeks satisfaction first in one thing and then in 
another. Hence he comments that: "the nature of man consists in this, that 
his will strives, is satisfied and strives anew, and so on for ever .... And cor-
responding to this the nature of melody is a constant digression and devia-
tion from the key-note in a thousand ways ... "46 The account developed in 
this paper is founded upon a different model of musical expressiveness, 
one which appeals to the resemblance between the movements of music 
and human expressive behaviour (rather than a resemblance between 
music and the movements of the will). On this account, there is no need to 
adopt Schopenhauer's Buddhistic metaphysic to find music metaphysical-
ly suggestive. It is enough to note a number of proposals drawn from con-
temporary philosophy of music. 
Firstly, the affective states expressed in music lack material objects, and 
can be grasped in "feelings" formed by way of a mirroring response. If that 
is so, then music can help to inculcate a certain quality of affective life, and 
this is enough to establish its religious significance in principle; for the faith 
traditions are concerned, of course, not only that believers should profess 
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right doctrine, but also that they should exhibit a correlative quality of 
affective life in their dealings with the world. Moreover, in so far as musi-
cal affects are lacking in action-guiding content, then they may have a part 
to play in fostering a "spiritual" or contemplative attitude towards the 
world; and in so far as they cannot be replicated by other means, they may 
even prove to be indispensable for the full articulation of a faith perspec-
tive, considered in terms of the "attitude" towards the world that it seeks 
to commend. Moreover, on certain quite widely adopted theological 
assumptions, some of the attitudes that are rightly displayed in relation-
ship to the world should also be displayed in relationship to God, and in 
this respect too, the mirroring responses engendered by music may prove 
to be religiously resonant. Lastly, we have also explored the theme that the 
religious potency of music in these respects may be unrivalled by other art 
forms, especially in so far as musical affects are more readily generalis able, 
and are experienced more intimately, than those evoked by other art 
forms. 
That music is religiously powerful is for many people an obvious datum 
of experience, and it is natural to wonder how music can impinge so pro-
foundly upon human lives. This paper shows, I hope, that the affinity 
between our musical experience and the life of faith is not simply a "brute" 
fact, but can be illuminated in some degree using the categories supplied 
by contemporary philosophy of musicY 
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